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In this paper, we analyze the extent to which past financial crises share common 
characteristics in Latin America, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.  We examine the 
recent crises in Asia and in Latin America, in particular their severity, to assess whether 
the considerable historical differences that we have documented for the earlier sample 
have eroded.  We conclude that in a deregulated world, the "well-behaved" Asian 
financia1 crises are a relic of the past. 
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   The devaluation of the Thai baht on 2 July 1997 generated waves of turbulence in 
currency and equity markets that surpassed the "tequila" effects in the wake of the 1994 
devaluation of the Mexican peso. The crisis first spread to East Asia in the form of a 
string of devaluations and stock-market collapses. As the problems intensified, the 
currencies of other Asian countries, including Hong Kong and South Korea, came under 
speculative pressure. Outside the region, Argentina, Brazil, and Russia suffered sharp 
declines in their equity markets and periodic bouts of speculation against their currencies.   
As the dust settles in currency markets, many of these countries will be left with 
serious banking-sector problems, if not full-scale banking crises, as in Thailand and 
South Korea. Our earlier work on financial crises suggested that economies behave 
differently on the eve of crises (see Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996). Typically, financial 
crises occur as an economy enters a recession that follows a prolonged boom in economic 
activity fueled by credit creation and surges in capital inflows. The cycle of overlending 
is exacerbated by implicit or explicit deposit guarantees, poor supervision, and moral-
hazard problems in the banking sector. 1 Crises are accompanied by an overvaluation of 
the currency, weakening exports,  and the bursting of asset price bubbles.  
In this paper, we extend that work by analyzing the extent to which past crises 
share common characteristics in Latin America, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. In 
addition, we examine the recent crises in Asia and in Latin America to determine whether 
the considerable regional differences that we find for the earlier sample have eroded. 
 
 
                                                 
1 See Ronald McKinnon and Huw Pill (1994) on the interaction of capital inflows and liberalization. 
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Regional Differences 
Between 1970 and 1995, Latin American countries (LA) suffered 50-percent 
more crises (per country) than the East Asian countries (EA), or the European and Middle 
Eastern countries (Others) in our sample. 2 This section examines whether currency and 
banking crises differed across regions. We begin by examining the behavior of 15 
economic indicators. The indicators used to capture the overlending cycles include the 
M2 multiplier, the ratio of domestic credit to nominal GDP, the real interest rate on 
deposits, and the ratio of lending-to-deposit interest rates. Increases in any of these 
indicators might signal possible financial-sector problems.3 Other financial indicators 
include "excess" real MI balances (to capture lax monetary policy), deposits at 
commercial banks (to assess whether there are runs in the midst of the crises), and 
the ratio of M2 (in dollars) to foreign exchange reserves in dollars (to examine to 
what extent the liabilities of the banking system were backed by international reserves). 
The current-account indicators are exports, imports, terms of trade, and deviations 
of the real exchange rate from trend. Declines in exports and the terms of trade, increases 
in imports, and real appreciations of the domestic currency signal potential problems in 
the current account. The capital-account indicators are foreign-exchange reserves of the 
central bank and domestic-foreign real-interest-rate differentials. Reserves losses and 
increasing interest-rate differentials are signals of future problems in the capital account. 
Finally, we include output and stock prices (in dollars), with declines in output 
and stock-market crashes signaling impending crises. The interest rate, the spreads, 
"excess" real balances, and real exchange rate deviations from trend are in levels, and all 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of how the crises are defined and dated, and countries in the sample, see Kaminsky and . 
Reinhart (1996). 
3 See Hali Edison and Marcus Miller (1997) on credit cycles. 
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other indicators are 12-month percentage changes.  In an earlier paper, we concluded that 
the behavior of most of these indicators in the months prior to the crises departed 
significantly from the behavior in "tranquil times," which is defined as all the months in 
the sample outside the 36 months around the crises. For instance, there were unusually  
large declines in equity prices relative to tranquil periods on the eve of the financial 
crises.  
To assess whether these pre-crisis deviations in individual indicators are larger in 
Latin America than in other regions, we measure volatility by calculating the mean 
absolute deviation from tranquil periods (as percentages) for each indicator in the 18 
months prior to the crisis for the three regions separately. The first column in Table 1 lists 
the indicators; the second column reports the mean deviation from tranquil periods for 
that indicator for Latin America; the third and fourth columns report the comparable 
mean absolute deviations for East Asia and Others, respectively. An asterisk denotes that 
the regional difference from Latin America, which is the benchmark, is statistically 
significant at the 5-percent confidence level. If we compare East Asia and Latin America 
currency crises (Table 1) 10 of the 15 indicators are significantly more volatile for Latin 
America, including all the financial and capital account indicators. The regional patterns 
for banking crises paint a similar picture, as the amplitude of the pre-crisis cycles relative 
to tranquil times is larger for Latin America than elsewhere. However, regional 
differences in volatility are diminishing. For instance, the decline in Thai equity prices (in 
U.S. dollars) since their 1995 peak exceeds 80 percent; the magnitude of this deviation 
from the norm during tranquil periods is more in line with those observed in the Latin 
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American  crises than in previous East Asia crises. Similar anomalies are evident in other 
indicators, such as credit. 
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While Table 1 presents evidence on the volatility of individual indicators, we now 
focus on their behavior as a group. As to the fragility of an economy on the eve of a 
crisis, our basic premise is that the more widespread the economic problems are, the 
larger should be the number of indicators that exhibit "anomalous" behavior on the eve of 
a crisis. 4  Thus, we need to tally, crisis-by-crisis, what proportion of the 15 indicators 
were showing aberrant behavior in the 24 months preceding the financial crisis. This 
information is summarized for the three regions in Table 2.  
 
For instance, in the 24-month period prior to Venezuela's currency crisis in May 
1994, 10 of the 15 (67 percent) of the indicators were exhibiting "anomalous" behavior; 
                                                 
4 For a detailed description of the methodology used to classify what is considered "anomalous" behavior 
in an indicator and what is not, see Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1996). 
 
 8
this crisis gets counted in the second row of Table 2, labeled 60-79 percent. Hence, the 
top row of each panel in Table 2 provides information on the share of the crises in our 
sample that were preceded by abnormal behavior in at least 80 percent of the indicators. 
Quite clearly, Latin American economies were more frail on the eve of crises than were 
economies in other regions. In 45 percent of the currency crises in Latin America, 80-100 
percent of the indicators were indicating problems. Only 29 percent of the East Asia 
crises were preceded by so many flashing red lights. A similar regional disparity is 
evident on the eve of past banking crises. 
To measure the severity of a currency crisis, we focus on a composite measure 
that averages reserve losses and the real exchange-rate depreciation. For reserves, we use 
the six-month percentage change prior to the crisis month, as reserve losses typically 
occur prior to the devaluation (if the attack is successful). For the real exchange rate, we 
use the six-month percentage change following the crisis month, because large 
depreciations occur after, and only if, the central bank concedes by devaluing or floating 
the currency. This measure of severity is constructed for each currency crisis in our 
sample, and the regional averages are reported in Table 3. For banking crises, we use the 
bailout costs, as a percentage of GDP, as the measure of severity; regional averages are 
also reported.  The first row of each panel in Table 3 presents evidence of the historical 
patterns; it is clear that the Latin American financial crises were far more severe than 
those elsewhere. The average severity index for currency crises is more than three times 
larger for Latin America than for East Asia; an even larger discrepancy is evident for the 
banking crises, where the average cost of the bailout is about seven times larger in Latin 
America than in Asia.  The second row in each panel records the readings of this index 
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for the recent crises, Argentina and Mexico in 1994-1995 and the ongoing crises in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Phillippines, and Thailand. The bailout costs of the banking sector 
are estimated to range from a low of about 7 percent of GDP for the Phillippines to over 
20 percent of GDP for Thailand. The picture that emerges is quite distinct from the 
historical pattern. Both on the currency and banking side, the severity of the recent crises 
is at par with those recorded for Latin America in the past.  For instance, for the Thai 
case, by mid-December the baht had depreciated about 80 percent while the percentage 
decline in reserves was of a similar magnitude, when the forward position is included. 
The cost of the bailout of banks has surpassed that of rescuing the Mexican banks (see 
Amar Bhattacharya et al., 1997). 
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Why Are Regional Differences Eroding? 
 
We have argued that, historically, financial crises have been more frequent and 
severe in Latin America than in other regions. Yet we conclude that the severity of the 
recent crises in East Asia matches Latin American  standards more closely than the East 
Asian historical norm. In this section, we speculate why the regional differences may be 
eroding.  
In the early 1990's, when capital began to flow to emerging market economies, 
countries in East Asia were enjoying substantial amounts of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and a low share of their capital inflows were short-term. By contrast, Latin 
America's poor track record of chronic inflation and low growth was cited as a key reason 
why a dominant share of the capital flowing to that region was of a short-term nature and 
FDI flows were comparatively scarce (Table 4). By 1996, these stark regional differences 
in the composition of capital flows had all but disappeared. 
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In several East Asian  countries, persistent bouts of sterilized intervention kept 
short-term interest rates high relative to international levels and acted as a magnet for 
short-term capital inflows. Indeed, the evidence presented in Peter J. Montiel and 
Reinhart (1998) suggests that these policies played a key role in explaining the rising 
volume of short-term flows that countries such as Malaysia and Thailand attracted. At the 
same time, a number of Latin American countries implemented major inflation-
stabilization programs, and growth in that region rebounded from its  bleak performance 
during the 1980's. Despite the setbacks associated with the Mexican crisis of December 
1994 and its "tequila" effects, the pattern of lower inflation and higher growth has 
persisted in 1996 and 1997. 
Largely owing to improved economic prospects in Latin America, FDI began to 
account for a rising share of capital flows to the region. In East Asia, the rising volume of 
short-term flows was largely intermediated by the poorly regulated and ill-supervised 
domestic banking sectors. Indeed, the overlending and asset price cycles in Asia of the 
1990's are rerniniscent of the cycles that followed financial liberalization in many Latin 
American countries. The policy dilemma that has recently characterized several Asian 
countries, the choice between high interest rates to defend the peg and ample liquidity to 
help troubled financial institutions, is also reminiscent of Chile's currency and banking 
crises in the 1980's. It appears that the combination of volatile international capital and 
weaknesses in the financial sector may be at the heart of the 1997 crises in East Asia and 
may explain their severity. 
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Concluding Remarks 
Historically, there were marked differences between the fierceness of financial 
crises in East Asia  and in Latin America.  In the 1990’s, Latin America made progress 
toward stabilization--although at the time of this writing Latin America remains 
vulnerable to contagion. At the same time, the severity of the 1997 East Asian financial 
crises has escalated to magnitudes not seen earlier in that region and is comparable to that 
of the Latin American financial crises of the past. Regional differences are eroding. 
What accounts for convergence is food for future research. However, on the basis 
of our analysis, one may speculate that some of the past differences in the volatility of the 
capital account and financial sector have diminished in the world of mobile capital and 
more deregulated financial markets. Regional differences in the composition of capital 
flows to the two regions eroded throughout the 1990’s, as an increasing volume of short-
term capital was funneled into Asia. Also, the booms in lending and asset prices that 
characterized the East Asian economies before the bubble burst in 1997 are reminiscent 
of the post-financial-liberalization episodes in Latin America. 
 It appears that in a deregulated world, the "well-behaved" Asian financia1 crises 
are a relic of the past. 
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